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REDEFINING PARENTAL RIGHTS: THE
CASE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
Cynthia Godsoe*
INTRODUCTION
Discussions of the constitutional elements of family law have
almost exclusively focused on marriage and adult intimate
relationships, particularly recently.1 In contrast, scholars and
reformers alike have given parenthood short shrift.2 Yet
parenthood, not marriage, was the first family relationship found
to be constitutionally significant. The United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly expressed a parent’s fundamental right to
raise her child as she sees fit.3 This line of cases has been used to
support significant parental choice in education, medical care, and
other aspects of child rearing.4 Parental autonomy is in large part

* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I appreciate the helpful
comments and suggestions of Jill Hasday, the excellent research assistance of Lauren
Rayner Davis and Neeti Sachdev, and the thoughtful editing of Tom Boyle.
1. Jill Hasday has pointed out that scholars have paid less attention to family law
than other areas of law. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 825, 828 (2004) (“Academic theorists have devoted much less attention to family law
than they have spent on thoroughly examining legal subjects like constitutional law.”).
Within family law, parenthood receives still less attention. I have previously examined the
focus on marriage over parenthood in the context of same-sex marriage. See Cynthia
Godsoe, Adopting the Gay Family, 90 TUL. L. REV. 311 (2015); Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect
Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J.F. 136 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/perfectplaintiffs.
2. There are of course exceptions including, significantly, the work of Doug
NeJaime in this symposium issue and elsewhere. See, e.g., Doug NeJaime, Before Marriage:
The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage,
102 CAL. L. REV. 87 (2014).
3. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding that parents may choose
to have their children taught a language in addition to English in school); Pierce v. Soc’y
of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (recognizing a
parent’s right to raise her children as she sees fit as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests”).
4. Parental rights in the medical care context, however, have increasingly been
limited by state courts. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918, 919 (N.Y. 1972) (per
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based on a presumption that parents’ and children’s interests
accord, that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the
best interests of their children.”5 It is also animated by the privacy
and liberty of choice about intimate relations at the heart of
constitutional family law.6
In this Article, I argue that this thick conception of parental
rights shields significant intrafamilial harms, specifically parental
corporal punishment.7 Since Blackstone’s time, the parental
discipline privilege has condoned parental assault on children in
the name of discipline.8 Every state has such a privilege. Many are
very broad, permitting any caregiver of the child to administer
corporal punishment bringing physical injury that stops short of
“severe bodily injury or death.”9 Parental corporal punishment
continues to be widely practiced,10 despite the overwhelming
curiam) (affirming lower court’s order of medical treatment despite the parents’ religious
objections even though the child’s life was not in imminent danger).
5. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2071 (2015). See also Melissa Murray, Rights
and Regulation: The Evolution of Sexual Regulation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 577 (2016).
7. I adopt the widely accepted sociological definition of corporal punishment to
mean any physical punishment, including spanking with or without objects, such as belts.
See, e.g., Benjamin Shmueli, Corporal Punishment in the Educational System Versus
Corporal Punishment by Parents: A Comparative View, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 282
(2010) (outlining definitions).
8. I use here the terminology employed in most states, the parental discipline
privilege, to mean exemption of certain adults from criminal liability for acts that would
otherwise be assault or battery. As noted below, this usually takes the form of an
affirmative defense.
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) (A.L.I. 2015).
10. Most states codify this by statute; a few do so by judicial decision. Studies show
that almost half of parents have corporally punished their children, with rates ranging from
77 percent to 13 percent depending upon the child’s age and sex. Murray A. Straus,
Prevalence, Societal Causes, and Trends in Corporal Punishment and Parents in World
Perspective, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 1, 3–6 (2010). A majority of Americans
continue to support parental corporal punishment. Id. at 15–16. This view is declining,
however, from over 90 percent in 1968 to 65–70 percent in 2005. See Stephanie Hanes, To
Spank or Not to Spank, Corporal Punishment in the U.S., CS MONITOR (Oct. 19, 2014),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2014/1019/To-spank-or-not-to-spank-Corporalpunishment-in-the-US (reporting on the research of Straus and other experts). See also
Child Trends Databank, Attitudes Towards Spanking: Indicators of Child and Youth WellBeing 3 (Figure 1) (Nov. 2015) https://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11
/51_Attitudes_Toward_Spanking.pdf (compiling GSS data to conclude that “[b]etween
1986 and 2014, the proportion of women who agreed or strongly agreed that it is sometimes
necessary to give a child a ‘good, hard spanking’ dropped by 22 percent (from 82 to 65
percent). While approval among men dropped seven percent between 1986 and 1991 (from
84 to 78 percent), it has since remained steady, and was at 76 percent in 2014.”). This
number has remained roughly consistent to date, although there are significant variations
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research demonstrating that it is ineffective at discipline and has
significant negative effects on children’s behavior and
socialization.11 These include a greater propensity for future
violence, and increased risk of mental health and cognitive
outcomes.12 These empirically proven harms are coupled with
injuries to personhood that perpetuate hierarchies along
gendered and racialized lines. Indeed, one expert recently argued
that corporal punishment, which is disproportionately high in
Black families, is a vestige of slavery that continues to operate to
subjugate and traumatize Black children and youth.13
No rationale supports this forgiveness of significant harm to
society’s most vulnerable members. A majority of states are silent
as to the rationale. Although the Court has never enumerated
corporal punishment as a parental right, a number of state and
federal courts have found it to be within a parent’s childrearing
prerogative.14 The main justifications commentators and judges
give include tradition and personal beliefs about childrearing.
One court recently acquitted a father for choking his teenaged
daughter, emphasizing her “strong belief” that juveniles should be
subject to physical discipline, and demonstrating willful blindness
to the research and documented injuries in that case.15 Another
recent decision relied heavily on a pre-Civil War case to reverse

by region, gender, race, and religion. See, e.g., Cathaleen Chen, Can You Spank Kids And
Be Foster Parent? Mass. High Court Says No, CHR. SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 8, 2016) (using
GSS data). Finally, approval ratings vary significantly depending upon the terminology
used in describing it. See Chloe Kerr, Mind Your Language, THE SUN (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2547037/word-spank-should-be-replaced-with-assaultbecause-it-legitimises-violence-against-children-say-psychologists (reporting research that
people’s approval of corporal punishment decreases significantly when the words hit, beat,
etc., are used instead of “spank”).
11. See discussion infra notes 69–72.
12. See infra notes 70–74.
13. See Stacey Patton, Stop Beating Black Children, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/opinion/sunday/stop-beating-black-child
ren.html (discussing her book SPARE THE KIDS: WHY WHUPPING CHILDREN WON’T
SAVE BLACK AMERICA (2017)).
14. Compare Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 523 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he [] parents’ liberty
interest in directing the upbringing and education of their children includes the right to
discipline them by using reasonable, nonexcessive corporal punishment, and to delegate
that parental authority to private school officials.”), with Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d
1385, 1389 (1997) (concluding that the Meyer line of cases does not give parents the right
to “strike a child with a belt without being” investigated and potentially prosecuted).
15. Carter v. Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
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the conviction of a father who severely beat his son with a paddle
after the boy refused to eat his dinner.16
Attempts to cabin parental corporal punishment via a mens
rea of truly disciplinary purpose or the like have not sufficiently
limited it. Instead, the expert consensus against it, and the threats
and cursing that often accompany it, reveal that parental corporal
punishment is at best a very misinformed attempt at discipline and
at worst a use of children as literal “whipping posts” for
frustration and rage.17 Accordingly, I argue that the parental
discipline privilege should be abolished as have all other
categorical status exceptions to a violent crime.18
Parental corporal punishment has been surprisingly ignored
in legal scholarship and policy reform. High-profile cases, such as
the recent prosecution of NFL star Adrian Peterson for
disciplining his five-year-old son with a tree branch, have
prompted significant discussion in the media and popular
forums.19 Social scientists have written extensively about the
harms of corporal punishments and recommended changed
terminology and other reforms.20 Advocates have succeeded in
banning corporal punishment in almost all other settings including
daycares and most schools. Yet scholars and reformers have failed
to examine the parental discipline privilege, despite its anomalous
nature. 21
16. See infra note 66 (discussing a 2017 North Carolina Court of Appeals decision).
17. For instance, the father in the case described in note 16 was cursing and screaming
at his son as he whipped him.
18. Other historic status exceptions, such as the ‘discipline’ of wives and apprentices
have long been abolished and crimes against these parties criminalized. See, e.g., Elizabeth
M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991).
19. For just two examples, see Susan Perry, Adrian Peterson Case Brings Corporal
Punishment Back into the Spotlight, MINNPOST (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.minnpost.
com/second-opinion/2014/09/adrian-peterson-case-brings-corporal-punishment-backspotlight; Anthony Zurcher, Adrian Peterson: Parenting, Punishment and Race, BBC
NEWS (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-29186080.
20. Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Andrew Grogan-Kaylor, Spanking and Child Outcomes:
Old Controversies and New Meta-Analyses, 30 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 13 (2016). See also infra
notes 69-72. Scholars from other fields are also beginning to examine corporal punishment.
For instance, a scholar of African-American history recently published a book on corporal
punishment in the Black community. See Patton, supra note 13.
21. The scant treatment of corporal punishment by legal scholars approaches it from
a children’s rights perspective. See, e.g., Deanna A. Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment:
A Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. U.L. REV. 447 (2003). This analysis is consonant with
mine, but fails to fully consider the parental rights justification for corporal punishment.
But see James G. Dwyer, Parental Entitlement and Corporal Punishment, 73 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 189 (2010). Dwyer does distinguish parental rights in this context from
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This is a particularly propitious time for an examination of
the parental discipline privilege. The constitutional analysis of
family status and privacy in the context of marriage and adult
intimacy has changed significantly in recent years to recognize
new equality norms.22 The constitutional analysis of parenthood
should similarly adapt to new empirical data and evolving social
norms against the exculpation of intrafamilial harms. I argue that
the forgiveness of parental corporal punishment is not just bad
policy, but is also an overreading of the parental rights
jurisprudence. Parental rights are not infinite; the state parens
patriae duty to protect children is a significant limitation on
parental choice. Indeed, state and children’s interests render
parental rights more flexible and context-specific than other
family constitutional rights.23 Abolishing the parental discipline
privilege is consistent both with this framework and a more
inclusive reading of family privacy.24
I begin this Article by delineating the constitutional
framework of parental rights to raise children, highlighting the
soft nature of these rights and their inextricable connection with
a duty of care. In Part II, I chart the breadth of the parental
discipline privilege exculpating parental assaults on children.
None of the rationales for this ongoing status exculpation are
sufficient in light of the social science literature on corporal
punishment’s extensive harms. Turning to the normative, I argue
in Part III that evolving standards of child rearing, and the flexible
nature of parental rights, militate towards abolishing the parental
discipline privilege. The conclusion flags lessons this examination
of the parental discipline privilege has for other parental decisions
and conduct.
I. SOFT PARENTAL RIGHTS
Parental rights were the first family privacy rights to be
expressly defined. In a line of cases concerning a parent’s right to
the core examples of education and medical care. Nonetheless, he stops short of arguing
that parental rights do not support corporal punishment.
22. Several examples include same-sex marriage, as well as the criminalization of
intimate partner violence and marital rape. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A
Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1406 (2000); Schneider, supra note
18, at 976; Cynthia Godsoe, Redrawing the Boundaries of Relational Crime, 68 ALA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2017); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2071 (2015).
23. See discussion infra Part I.
24. See infra notes 115-118.
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choose their children’s education, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly confirmed that “[the] primary role of parents in the
upbringing of their children is . . . an enduring American
tradition.”25 Recently, the Court again emphasized a broad swath
of parental discretion, holding that parents may decide who may
visit their children, including barring other relatives from doing
so.26 Parental rights are based on family privacy, the recognition
of a diversity of families, and the parental ability to best care for
and nurture future citizens.27 The last rationale—the presumption
that parents act with their children’s best interests in mind—is
particularly important.28 As the Court has stated, a parent’s
“natural bonds of affection lead [her] to act in the best interests
of [her] children.”29 Even the early cases remain salient today;
Meyer v. Nebraska was cited in Obergefell v. Hodges to support a
right to same-sex marriage.30 Parental control is much stronger in
the American legal canon than in other Western countries, a
prerogative that I and other scholars have critiqued.31
Despite the rhetoric infusing the parental rights opinions,
however, parental rights are more limited than other privacybased fundamental rights. Tellingly, the Court has declined to
apply strict scrutiny to state regulation of parental rights, arguably
rendering these rights quasi-fundamental, if that.32 In Troxel v.
25. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (holding that parents may
choose to have their children taught a language in addition to English in school); Pierce,
268 U.S. at 535; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205.
26. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (recognizing a parent’s right to raise her children as she
sees fit as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests”).
27. Id.
28. The presumption is not, however, absolute. Rather, the Court has cautioned that
“experience and reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point.” Parham, 442
U.S. at 602.
29. Id.
30. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 14–15.
31. Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113 (2013);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns The Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child
as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992) (arguing that the right of parental
control, although termed a liberty interest, seems to posit children as parental property).
32. In Troxel, the Court articulated a presumption in favor of a fit parent’s choices
rather than a strict scrutiny standard. Shulman further points out that the plurality opinion
in Troxel uses the term fundamental rights numerous times, but does not address the claim
at issue as a true fundamental right. See JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PARENT: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE CHILD 126–
27 (2014); see also Jeffrey Shulman, Does the Constitution Protect A Fundamental Right to
Parent?, CONST. DAILY (July 8, 2014), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/07/does-theconstitution-protect-a-fundamental-right-to-parent (“The Supreme Court has echoed the
popular assumption that the right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
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Granville, its most recent opinion, the Court outlined a
presumption that a fit parent’s choices cannot be second-guessed
by the state—significantly less than a fully protected right. It also
explicitly limited the strongest case of parental rights, Wisconsin
v. Yoder, to its unusual facts, involving the insular and self-reliant
Amish community.33 Indeed, courts have clarified that harm is not
required for intervention into the parent-child relationship; in
contrast, the state may “reasonably” regulate children’s
education, health, and general care.34 Even the early cases
described parental liberty both as a right and an obligation, “the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [a
child] for [his] additional obligations.”35
Parental rights are further limited by the state’s parens
patriae duty to protect children. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the
Court limited parental discretion. Proclaiming that the “state has
a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority
in things affecting the child’s welfare,” the Court upheld a child
labor law prohibiting a Jehovah’s Witness from taking her tenyear-old ward to proselytize with her on the street.36 Protection is
necessary not only for the child’s sake but also for society’s, given
its need for “the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people
into full maturity as citizens[.]”37
Several prescient scholars have highlighted the “tenuous”
and relative nature of parental rights.38 In a recent history of the
parental rights cases, Jeffrey Shulman demonstrates that, contrary

custody, and nurture of their children is a deeply rooted one . . . . But no Supreme Court
case has held that the right of parents to make such choices is a fundamental one.”). Several
state courts, however, have applied strict scrutiny, at least as to the rights of “fit parents”
(a somewhat circular inquiry). See, e.g., In re Custody of BMH, 315 P.3d 470, 487 (Wash.
2013).
33. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 (predicting that “few other religious groups or sects” could
make the necessary showing). Shulman aptly describes this case as “idiosyncratic . . . [i]ts
reasoning is a strange brew of romantic projection and conscious self-deception, something
akin to infatuation [with the Amish way of life] from a court old enough to know better.”
SHULMAN, supra note 32, at 110.
34. The Court also notes the lack of harm in cases upholding parental rights. See, e.g.,
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230 (finding no evidence of “any harm to the physical or mental health
of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare”).
35. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
36. Prince, 321 U.S. at 167.
37. Id. at 168.
38. SHULMAN, supra note 32, at 8; see also SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, THE YODER
CASE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, EDUCATION, AND PARENTAL RIGHTS 175 (2003) (noting
that Yoder’s “constitutional legacy did not prove to be especially durable”).
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to popular belief, parental rights have always been limited in the
name of societal interests and enlightened childrearing. He quotes
nineteenth-century Justice Joseph Story critiquing absolute
parental rights as uncivilized and opining that the state has the
power “to control the conduct of the [parent] in the education of
his children.”39 Similarly, constitutional scholar David Meyer
concludes that modern jurisprudence establishes parental rights
as “essentially soft” and merely presumptive based on the need to
accommodate societal and children’s interests.40
As noted above, the Court has never considered whether
parental control includes a parental right to corporal punishment.
Most statutes which codify the parental discipline privilege
likewise never explicitly mention parental rights.41 Lower courts
considering the issue have gone both ways, but the majority have
found a narrow right to parental corporal punishment. For
instance, the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts recently
reversed a parent’s assault and battery conviction for briefly
spanking a three-year-old with his hand.42 The Court noted the
delicate balance “between protecting children from punishment
that is excessive in nature, while at the same time permitting
parents to use limited physical force in disciplining their children
without incurring criminal sanction.”43 Similarly, several other
state and federal courts have expressed a parent’s right to use
“reasonable” corporal punishment.44 Others, however, have
39.
40.

Id. at 3.
DAVID D. MEYER, FAMILY DIVERSITY AND THE RIGHTS OF PARENTHOOD, in
WHAT IS PARENTHOOD?: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY 124 (Linda C.
McClain & Daniel Cere eds., 2013). As discussed further below, scholars have posited a
trustee rather than ownership-based notion of constitutional parenthood, consistent with
the soft nature of parental rights.
41. Indeed, almost half the states do not specify any rationale for the parental
discipline privilege. Several state laws, however, arguably imply parental rights in legally
authorizing reasonable parental corporal punishment. See, e.g., AS. STAT. § 11.81.430
(prescribing that parent or person in loco parentis has the “authority” to discipline).
42. Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 861 (Mass. 2015).
43. Id. at 868.
44. See, e.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 523 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he [] parents’ liberty
interest in directing the upbringing and education of their children includes the right to
discipline them by using reasonable, nonexcessive corporal punishment, and to delegate
that parental authority to private school officials.”); State v. Wilder, 748 A.2d 444, 449 (Me.
2000) (holding that a parent has the fundamental right to “use [] reasonable or moderate
force to control behavior” and this finds expression in the parental discipline privilege
codified in Maine law); State v. Rosa, 6 N.E.3d 57, 59 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (noting “a
parent’s fundamental constitutional right to child-rearing, which includes a right to impose
reasonable discipline, including the use of corporal punishment”).

GODSOE_DRAFT 8.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

REDEFINING PARENTAL RIGHTS

7/6/17 5:34 PM

289

concluded that striking a child with a belt is not protected under
the parental privilege.45
Those courts recognizing a constitutional element to the
parental discipline privilege rely both on parents’ rights cases and
on a more general right to family privacy.46 These courts, however,
clarify that this activity is limited; as one bluntly put it: “child
abuse is not constitutionally protected activity.”47 Courts have
also been careful to note the competing interests of family
autonomy and child protection—a balancing that is much less
explicit in the Supreme Court parental rights cases involving
education. For instance, one federal court cautioned that corporal
punishment cases raise “an inherent tension between the privacy
and sanctity of the family, including the freedom to raise children
as parents see fit, and the interest of the state in the safety and
well-being of children.”48 Similarly, the Massachusetts high court
noted its “deep mindful[ness] of the dual important interests
implicated in the defense: the welfare of children requiring
protection against abuse, on the one hand, and, on the other, the
avoidance of unnecessary State interference in parental
autonomy as it concerns child rearing.”49 These courts’ depiction
of parental rights is not robust. Indeed, all of these opinions focus
considerably more on tradition and practicality than parental
rights, rationales I argue below are not legitimate grounds for
forgiving assault and battery.50

45. See Sweaney, 119 F.3d at 1389 (concluding that the Meyer line of cases does not
give parents the right to “strike a child with a belt without being” investigated and
potentially prosecuted).
46. See, e.g., State v. Sinica, 372 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Neb. 1985) (citing cases including
Griswold, Meyer, Pierce). In a number of these cases, the parents hit their children in a
public place. For instance, the mother in Sweaney hit her child at school in front of
teachers. See Sweaney, 119 F.3d at 1387. The father in Dorvil spanked and allegedly kicked
his child on the street, witnessed by two police officers. See 32 N.E.3d at 864. As discussed
further below—see infra notes 104-108—some courts seem to consider this significant in
adjudicating the permissibility of the punishment, although I argue this distinction is not
relevant.
47. Sinica, 372 N.W.2d at 449 (articulating rights to familial privacy and parental
choices in child-rearing).
48. United States v. Rivera, 54 M.J. 489, 491 (C.A.A.F 2001).
49. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d at 863. Shortly after its decision in Dorvil, the Massachusetts
high court forbade foster parents from engaging in corporal punishment. See Magazu v.
Dep’t of Children & Families, 42 N.E.3d 1107 (Mass. 2016).
50. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d at 866–67 (discussing history).
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II. THE PARENTAL DISCIPLINE PRIVILEGE
This Part charts the broad scope of the parental discipline
privilege—a scope not supported by contemporary readings of
parental rights. It then turns to the harms of this exception to
criminal assault law, detailing the overwhelming research
consensus that even mild corporal punishment brings a risk of
significant developmental consequences. It concludes by
documenting the growing domestic consensus which have led to
the abolition of corporal punishment in other settings and,
internationally, even in the home.
A. PARENTAL DISCIPLINE PRIVILEGE
Every state grants parents the right to physically punish their
children with no criminal liability for assault and battery. Most
jurisdictions have codified the parental discipline privilege either
as an affirmative defense to prosecution or as part of the statutory
definition of child abuse; others have recognized the privilege
judicially.51 It is framed as a justification, not an excuse, meaning
that the conduct itself is deemed innocent.52 The parental
discipline privilege is the only remaining status-based exculpation
for assault; others such as intimate partner violence and the
beating of apprentices and students, have long been abolished.
Accordingly, as Jill Hasday points out, the parental discipline
privilege contradicts the family law “progress narrative” that
children’s wellbeing has been increasingly protected.53
51. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10(1) (McKinneys 2015) (“The use of physical
force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and
not criminal [when] . . . 1. A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and
supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one . . . may use physical force, but not
deadly physical force, upon such person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes
it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person.”); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.136b(9) (2015) (“This section does not prohibit a parent or guardian,
or other person permitted by law or authorized by the parent or guardian, from taking
steps to reasonably discipline a child, including the use of reasonable force.”); 11 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-9-5.3(d) (2015) (“For the purpose of this section, ‘other physical injury’ is
defined as any injury, other than a serious bodily injury, which arises other than from the
imposition of nonexcessive corporal punishment.”).
52. See, e.g., ALASKA PENAL CODE 11.81.430 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 939.45(5) (2017);
Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d at 870.
53. JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 133–35, 147–48 (2014)
(theorizing that “stories about the triumph of children’s best interests can divert attention
from examining how family law actually regulates the parent-child relationship and from
considering the normative question. . . Where should family law prioritize parental
prerogatives, and where, how, and to what extent does family law’s continued deference
to parental rights over children’s interests need to be reformed?”).
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The privilege historically attached only to fathers, but has
since been extended to all legal parents and guardians.54 Most
states also allow custodians or persons acting as a parent to assert
the privilege.55 Accordingly, it has a very broad scope; a significant
number of people without a legal relationship to a child, such as a
mother’s boyfriend, are permitted to corporally punish that child
with no criminal liability.56
All states forgive parental assault that brings some harm,
allowing, for instance, corporal punishment on even very young
children and condoning hitting them with objects, such as a
wooden spoon or leather belt.57 Accordingly, the scope of
permissible physical punishment goes well beyond the oft-raised
example of a parent grabbing a toddler to keep her from running
into the street. Every state permits some physical harm and nonsevere mental or emotional injury.58 Numerous states, and the
54. The Massachusetts Stubborn Child Statute permitted fathers to kill misbehaving
children. Some states still limit it to these categories. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:18 (2015) (“This
defense of justification can be claimed . . . . (4) When the offender’s conduct is reasonable
discipline of minors by their parents . . . .”); WIS. STAT. § 939.45(5)(a)(3), (5)(b) (2017)
(stating the defense of privilege can be claimed “[w]hen the actor’s conduct is reasonable
discipline of a child by a person responsible for the child’s welfare” and explaining
“‘[p]erson responsible for the child’s welfare’ includes the child’s parent, stepparent, or
guardian”).
55. Forty states allow custodians to assert the privilege, thirty-four go even further,
allowing adults in loco parentis to do so. See, e.g., O.R.C. § 2151.031(C) (2015) (defining
child abuse but excluding “a child exhibiting evidence of corporal punishment or other
physical disciplinary measure by a parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or
control, or person in loco parentis” if the discipline satisfies the standard codified
elsewhere); J.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 773 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(finding that an 11-year-old child was not abused when the stepfather, acting in loco
parentis, used a belt to spank the child on the buttocks, which produced bruising).
56. The extremely broad, functional definition in the corporal punishment context
stands in sharp contrast to other definitions of parents in the criminal and family law. See
Godsoe, Relational Crime, supra note 22. I note this primarily to emphasize the sweep of
the harm of corporal punishment, since many cases involve non-parents whose physical
discipline is excused under the parental discipline privilege.
57. In determining the reasonableness of punishment, courts look at a variety of
factors including the child’s age, gender, the form, amount, and bodily location of the
hitting, and the “totality of the circumstances.” See, e.g., Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d at 870.
58. See, e.g., HI REV. STAT. § 703-309 (2011) (“The force used [must] not
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently create a risk of causing substantial
bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress, or neurological damage.”).
Some statutes attempt to limit harm inflicted by providing categorical exclusions of certain
children (i.e., below a certain age such as “nonaccidental injury to a child under the age of
18 months” or “shaking a minor under three years of age”) or particular types of acts (e.g.,
throwing, kicking, burning, biting, cutting, striking with a closed fist, interfering with
breathing, or threatening with a deadly weapon) from the parental privilege. D.C. CODE §
16-2301 (2016); 11 DEL. CODE § 468 (2016); HI REV. STAT. § 703-309 (2011); RCW §
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Model Penal Code, go quite a bit further, and explicitly permit a
wide swath of parental discipline as long as it does not risk “severe
bodily injury or death.”59 Corporal punishment is still widely
practiced, with over half of American adults engaging in it.60
Parents in the South, fundamentalist Christian parents and Black
parents are significantly more likely to use physical discipline.61
The most common rationales offered for the parental
discipline privilege are historic or personal, neither of which
justifies the broad exculpation of assault against children.62 The
reliance on tradition rather than empirics or deliberate policy is
evident in the fact that about half of states do not cite any
rationale for this anachronistic exemption, while those that do cite

9A.16.100 (2012) (prescribing that harm must not be “greater than transient pain or minor
temporary marks”).
59. Parental privilege applies when “(a) the force is used for the purpose of
safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, including the prevention or
punishment of his misconduct; and (b) the force used is not designed to cause or known to
create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme
pain or mental distress or gross degradation.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) (A.L.I.
2015). This standard does not require that the force be reasonable or that the parent
reasonably believes the use of force is appropriate. See id. § 3.08 cmt. 2.
60. See Straus, supra note 10, at 3–6. Rates are particularly high among babies and
toddlers. See Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against Corporal
Punishment of Children: Converging Evidence From Social Science Research and
International Human Rights Law and Implications for U.S. Public Policy, 13 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL’Y & L. 231, 232 (2007). As to public opinion, see Steve Hendrix, The End of
Spanking?, WASH. POST MAG. (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle
/magazine/the-end-of-spanking/2013/01/02/d328cf1e-3273-11e2-bb9b-288a310849ee_story
.html (reporting that 65 to 75 percent of people believe that “it is okay to occasionally
spank a child”). In recent years, support for corporal punishment has declined modestly.
Attitudes Towards Spanking, CHILDTRENDS.ORG (2015), http://www.childtrends.org
/indicators/attitudes-toward-spanking (using biannual GSS data).
61. This was the topic of one episode of the popular television show black-ish. See
James Poniewozik, black-ish Whips Up a Conversation About Spanking, TIME (Oct. 23,
2014), http://time.com/3534219/review-blackish-spanking; see also Harry Enten,
Americans’ Opinions on Spanking Vary By Party, Race, Region and Religion,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:49 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/american
s-opinions-on-spanking-vary-by-party-race-region-and-religion/ (using data from 19862010 to demonstrate the “large gaps” in opinion between evangelical Christians and other
Americans, reporting that African-Americans are 11 percent more likely to support
corporal punishment than whites including Hispanics, and showing that people in the
South are 17 percent more likely to support spanking than those in the Northeast).
62. See Godsoe, Relational Crime, supra note 22; see also Dwyer, supra note 21, at
192 (noting that “parental-entitlement claim[s], although once common and certainly
sometimes still expressed, [are] not especially prominent in debates concerning corporal
punishment today”).
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a rationale usually do so in vague and conclusory terms.63 Courts
continue to cite Blackstone’s centuries-old statement of a parent’s
power to “lawfully correct his child. . . in a reasonable manner; for
. . . the benefit of his education.”64 These historic rationales are
sometimes coupled with religious justifications. “Spare the rod
and spoil the child” remains a frequently, if incorrectly, cited
Biblical passage and, tellingly, fundamentalist Christians are
significantly more likely than other Americans to support and use
corporal punishment.65
One recent case before the North Carolina Supreme Court
demonstrates the problems with depending on tradition alone to
demarcate the boundaries of the privilege. Dean Michael Varner,
angered by his ten-year-old son’s “picky eating,” beat him with a
paddle on his legs and feet. He cursed and yelled at the child while
doing so, and the assault resulted in “bruising from [the boy’s]
knee to his waist,” pain and several days of impaired walking. The
jury acquitted Varner of felony child abuse, but convicted him of
a misdemeanor. In reversing Varner’s conviction and granting
him a new trial, the appellate court relied heavily on a 180-yearold case. That case outlined the “sacred duties of parents to train
up and qualify their children, for becoming useful and virtuous
members of society. . . to command obedience, to control
stubbornness, . . . and to reform bad habits.”66 Reliance on a
precedent from a time when slavery, marital rape, and the
physical punishment of apprentices were still allowed permits a

63. See Walter E. Williams, Making a Case for Corporal Punishment, INSIGHT ON
NEWS (Sept. 13, 1999), https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-55821653/making-acase-for-corporal-punishment.
64. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *440; see also 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120 (positing parental discipline as an exception to
battery: “battery is, in some cases, justifiable or lawful; as where one who hath authority,
a parent or master, gives moderate correction to his child, his scholar, or his apprentice.”).
65. See MURRAY A. STRAUS & DENISE A. DONNELLY, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT
OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES AND ITS EFFECTS ON
CHILDREN 183–84 (1994) (detailing the relationship between religion and corporal
punishment and noting that this passage refers to a shepherd guiding or redirecting his
flock of sheep, not striking them); see also Magazu, 473 Mass. at 431 (arguing that because
physical discipline is an integral aspect of their Christian faith, the department’s decision
to deny their license as foster parents impermissibly infringes on their constitutional right
to the free exercise of religion).
66. The Sanford Herald, Guest Editorial: N.C. Spanking Case Raises Questions on
Parental Rights, WILSON TIMES (March 19, 2017, 7:50 PM), available at http://www.wilson
times.com/stories/guest-editorial-nc-spanking-case-raises-questions-on-parental-rights,82
322.
THE
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distortion of the parental role and obscures the significant harms
of corporal punishment.
In support of corporal punishment, commentators frequently
cite their own experiences growing up or their beliefs about child
rearing, even though they are contradicted by all the child
development research. Typical is this advocate, arguing that
“[r]egardless of what the experts preach, the undeniable fact is the
‘uncivilized’ practice of whipping children produced more
civilized young people. . .”67 Another explicitly disregards the
empirical data: “While some studies have shown the negative
effects of spanking, today’s disrespectful youth have shown what
happens when necessary spanking is forgone. . . Some kids need
it, period. When time-out, talking and taking away toys doesn’t
work, you have to get that butt.”68 Adherents range from parents
who want to instill fear in children for obedience,69 to others who
are concerned that their children are already at a disadvantage, as
with African-American boys, and thus need to be firmly, i.e.
physically, disciplined at home or they will suffer in society.70
This sentiment has even been expressed by courts. One trial
court judge expressed a lot of sympathy for a father who had
choked and used a belt to beat his teenaged daughter for
disobeying him and texting photographs of herself wearing her
underwear to friends:
[N]ot only do I believe that you um, had cause[] to discipline
her, I do. I also strongly believe that—that kids should be
subject to discipline punishment under certain circumstances, I
do. I have boys myself. If I had a girl who was posing half
necked [sic] on social media, I would also be wearing orange
[in jail] because you would not be able to hold me back from
her. So, I totally understand why you were as angry as you

67. Williams, supra note 63.
68. See L. Nicole Williams, 8 Reasons to Spank Your Kids, MADAMENOIRE (Feb. 8,
2011), http://madamenoire.com/40373/8-reasons-to-spank-your-kids.
69. See id. (“To be feared (in the sense of reverence) is to be respected. Your children
should be weary [sic] of going against your rules. It also teaches them to submit to authority
regardless of whether or not they agree.”).
70. See Bill Briggs, Adrian Peterson Case: Some Parents Say Spankings Improved
Them, NBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2014, 12:18 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/nflcontroversy/adrian-peterson-case-some-parents-say-spankings-improved-them-n206516;
Patton, supra note 13 (“Today, black parents are still about twice as likely as white and
Latino families to use corporal punishment on their children. I’ve heard many black people
attribute their successes, or the fact that they weren’t in jail, on drugs or dead, to the
beatings they received as children.”).
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were, and why you did what you did. Because I’m assuming you
were trying to prevent her from living a life you don’t want her
to live. Which is, getting pregnant at a young age, dropping out
of school, getting her[]self physical[ly] assaulted, things like
that. I assumed why you did what you did. Um, unfortunately,
I think we’re in this universe now, where parents don’t just get
to do whatever they want.71

Not surprisingly in light of this discourse, the judge acquitted the
father on the most serious charges.
Courts look at whether the parent reasonably believed that
physical discipline was necessary or appropriate.72 In this way, the
mens rea of the discipline privilege incorporates the parental role.
The mens rea analysis often explicitly assesses the reason for the
discipline, such as what type of misbehavior the child engaged in
and how serious it was, as well as the related questions of the
parent’s frequency of corporal punishment, and other disciplinary
methods he or she has tried. Others examine whether the
punishment “safeguarded” or “promoted” the child’s welfare.73
The reasonableness requirement built into these tests
demonstrates that parental discipline must comport with some
standards of efficacy. Problematically, however, the parental
mens rea transforms corporal punishment from assault to parental
care; demonstrating this, one court distinguished physical
violence from “disciplinary spankings” to reverse a finding of
child abuse against the child’s mother.74
71. Carter v. Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1041 (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. § 627:6 (2016) (“[W]hen and to the extent that he [or
she] reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or punish such minor’s misconduct . . . .”).
73. See, e.g., 11 DEL. CODE § 468 (2016) (allowing for two justifications, either when
the “force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the child”
or when the “force used is intended to benefit the child”); see also ALASKA PENAL CODE
§ 11.81.430 (2016) (“[T]o promote the welfare of the child . . . .”); ARKANSAS CODE § 5-2605 (2010) (“[T]o promote the welfare of the minor . . . .”); C.R.S. § 18-1-703 (2009);
C.G.S.A. § 53a-18 (2011) (“[T]o promote the welfare of such minor . . . .”); KRS § 503.110
(“[T]o promote the welfare of a minor . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1413 (1975) (“[F]or
the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor . . . .”); N.D.C.C. § 12.105-05 (2013) (“[F]or the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the minor’s welfare,
including prevention and punishment of the minor’s misconduct, and the maintenance of
proper discipline . . . .”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (McKinney’s 2015) (“[T]o promote the
welfare . . . .”); O.R.S. § 161.205 (2015) (“[T]o promote the welfare of the minor . . . .”); 18
PA. C.S.A. § 509 (1992) (“[T]he force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting
the welfare of the minor . . . .”); V.A.M.S. 563.061 (1978) (“[T]o promote the welfare of a
minor . . . .”).
74. Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 223 Cal.App.4th 72 (6th
Cir. 2014).
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B. HARMS OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
Medical and psychological expertise almost unanimously
confirm that corporal punishment, even moderate, is not effective
at teaching children and is in fact harmful.75 In addition to physical
injury, corporal punishment is correlated with increased risk of
thirteen detrimental mental health, behavioral, and cognitive
outcomes.76 As a result, professional organizations such as the
American Academy of Pediatrics have issued strong statements
against its use.77 Significantly, experts have found a correlation
between corporal punishment and more serious parental violence
against children.78 The difficulty in delineating between
appropriate, non-harmful corporal punishment and abuse is
especially problematic, leading one court to recently conclude
that: “The [state interest in protecting children] is particularly
powerful in the context of corporal punishment, given the risk
that the parental privilege defense will be used as a cover for
instances of child abuse.”79
These empirical harms are coupled with more intangible
harms to personhood. Being beaten, particularly by someone
entrusted to care for you, is humiliating. Society’s condoning of
this assault conveys problematic lessons about obedience, power,
and physical force. It is not surprising that children who are
physically disciplined are significantly more likely to be violent
with their spouses or their own children as adults.80 Indeed, the
entrenched hierarchy of parental corporal punishment is so
problematic that one scholar recently analogized it to slavery.
Stacey Patton also opines that slavery likely contributed to its
ongoing disproportionate use in Black families. In a “kick the
dog” fashion, adult slaves “who endured the trauma of their own
75. See Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against Corporal
Punishment of Children, 13 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y & L. 231, 238–41 (2007) (cataloguing
research on the harms).
76. See Gershoff & Grogan-Kaylor, supra note 20 (meta-analysis of over 100 studies
on corporal punishment).
77. See American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of
Child and Family Health, Guidance for Effective Discipline, 101 PEDIATRICS 723 (1998)
(“Corporal punishment is of limited effectiveness and has potentially deleterious side
effects. The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends that parents be encouraged
and assisted in the development of methods other than spanking for managing undesired
behavior.”).
78. Pollard, supra note 21, at 621.
79. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d at 868.
80. See Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 77.
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beatings, inherited their oppressors’ violence and, for centuries,
passed down these parenting beliefs.” Patton terms this pattern:
one of the saddest untold stories in American history—the way
in which the victims of racist oppression and violence have hurt
the bodies of their own children in an effort to protect them
from a hostile society. . .The truth is that white supremacy has
done a masterful job of getting Black people to continue its
trauma work and call it “love.”81

Patton critiques the Black leaders who continue to support
corporal punishment and bemoans the many Black parents who
beat their children in the name of discipline and/or permit them
to be “paddled” at school in the states that allow parents to make
this choice. She calls for the Black community to stop using
corporal punishment because it erodes children’s humanity and
teaches them blind obedience. These are problematic for all
communities, but particularly Black children, who need to learn
to object to their victimization and resist violence, particularly
racialized violence.
The recognition of these harms has led to the banning of
corporal punishment in most other settings, including prisons, day
cares, and mental health facilities.82 The use of corporal
punishment in schools has also been severely curtailed in recent
decades. Until the 1980s, corporal punishment of students by
teachers and administrators was legally permissible and routinely
practiced nationwide. As of 2016, thirty-one states and the
District of Columbia had banned corporal punishment in schools,
largely driven by increased knowledge about both the harms of
corporal punishment and the effectiveness of non-physical
disciplinary methods.83 Several of the states still permitting it only
81. Patton, supra note 13.
82. See Letter from John B. King, Jr. to Governors and Chief State School Officers
(Nov. 22, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/files/corporalpunishment-dcl-11-22-2016.pdf (“Corporal punishment has also been banned in . . . U.S.
prisons and U.S. military training facilities, and most juvenile detention facilities” and “[a]
long list of education, medical, civil rights, disabilities, and child advocacy groups . . . have
also been calling for a ban on this practice.”); see also Melinda D. Anderson, Where
Teachers Are Still Allowed to Spank Students: Corporal Punishment is Legal in 19 States,
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/12/
corporalpunishment/420420.
83. State Laws, GUNDERSEN CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE (2017),
http://www.gundersenhealth.org/ncptc/center-for-effective-discipline/discipline-and-thelaw/state-laws; Steve Hendrix, End of Spanking?, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2013)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/the-end-of-spanking/2013/01/02/d328
cf1e-3273-11e2-bb9b-288a310849ee_story.html.
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allow teacher corporal punishment if parents give written
permission,84 and the vast majority of children “paddled” in
schools live in just five states—Mississippi, Texas, Alabama,
Arkansas, and Georgia.85 Citing extensive data on the harms of
physical punishment, the Secretary of Education called for a
nationwide ban on educational corporal punishment in December
2016, and several jurisdictions are currently working towards this
recommendation.86
The data on its harms has also led to an international trend
of banning parental corporal punishment. Sweden was the first
country to do so in 1979, and recently France brought the total to
52 worldwide.87 In doing so, these nations cited the psychological
and expressive harms of permitting assault on society’s most
vulnerable members, as well as international law equating
corporal punishment with other physical assaults and torture.88
***
In this Part, I have argued that the broad scope of the
parental discipline privilege is unsupported by the offered
rationales of personal experience and outdated tradition. In the
next Part, I lay out a fuller argument for abolishing the parental
discipline privilege, contending that its persistence in the face of
its documented harms reflects both a criminal law anomaly and
an overreading of parental rights.

84. Ohio, Utah, Texas, and North Carolina all allow parents to place their children
on a “no-paddle list.” See Anderson, supra note 82.
85. See Anderson, supra note 82.
86. See Letter from King, supra note 82.
87. See Constance Gibbs, France Says ‘Non!’ to Hitting Kids as It Bans Corporal
Punishment, NY DAILY NEWS (Jan. 4, 2017, 10:40 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/lifestyle/france-hitting-kids-bans-corporal-punishment-article-1.2934219 (detailing that 52
countries worldwide have now banned corporal punishment, including most of
Europe); see also CNN, Corporal Punishment Policies Around the World, CNN.COM (Nov.
9, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/11/08/country.comparisons.
corporal.punishment/ (“Sweden, in 1979, was the first to make it illegal to strike a child as
a form of discipline. Since then, many other countries in Europe have also instituted bans,
as have New Zealand and some countries in Africa and the Americas.”).
88. See United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Res. 44/25, Art.
37(a) (Nov. 20 1989), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/crc.pdf (“No
child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”).
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III. BANNING PARENTAL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
I argue in this Part that the parental discipline privilege
should be abolished. Constitutional norms are not a bar, and
instead militate towards, this change. The malleable and more
limited nature of parental rights, the empirical evidence of harm
from corporal punishment, and an evolving consensus about
appropriate childrearing conduct, all support abolition.
Parental rights, as noted above, are flexible and must take
into account the interests of both the state and children. A
primary rationale for them is that parents are in the best position
to care for and raise children.89 Because of this, parental rights are
intertwined with duties.90 Incorporating this vision of
constitutional parenthood as a double-sided coin, scholars have
posited parents as fiduciaries or trustees of their children, rather
than owners or masters.91 In this framework, parents have no right
to “control” their children; instead they have an obligation to
nurture and raise them to be the best future citizens.92 When
parents make choices that “compromise children’s developmental
needs or the stability . . . of the polity, the state may justly
intervene.”93
The doctrinal requirement that adults exercise corporal
punishment for the child’s welfare, or with a reasonable belief that
it is necessary or appropriate, reflects this presumption. The
growing consensus by medical professionals and research
documenting the harmful effects of corporal punishment,
however, demonstrate that it can no longer be justified in a child’s
89. See supra notes 27–29.
90. Prior to Troxel, in Lehr v. Robertson the Supreme Court noted that parental
rights are “the counterpart of the responsibilities [parents] have assumed.” 463 U.S. 248,
257 (1983).
91. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2401 (1995). Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parent’s Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1746 (1993) (outlining a “generist”
framework wherein parents are tasked with nurturing children, as trustees rather than
owners). Shulman’s reading of the constitutional and family law doctrine provides
historical support for this conception of parent as trustee. See SHULMAN, supra note 32, at
166–67. Consistent with this vision is a developmentally-based model of parental rights put
forward by, among others, philosopher Shelley Burtt. See Shelley Burtt, The Proper Scope
of Parental Authority: Why We Don’t Owe Children an “Open Future,” 44 CHILD, FAM. &
ST. 243 (2003).
92. Burtt, supra note 91, at 260 (describing “the sorts of goods that children must
receive to grow, at a minimum, into socially competent, civically responsible, financially
resourceful adults”).
93. Id. at 259–60.
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interest. Put another way, it is no longer reasonable to believe that
corporal punishment is truly for a child’s welfare.94 Stripped of this
assumption, the real reasons behind much parental violence
towards children are revealed—frustration and anger, perhaps
coupled with antiquated notions of children as property.95 These
motivations against the child’s interests, coupled with corporal
punishment’s documented harm, outweigh parental choice and
any historic or personal rationales for this archaic exculpation.
Like intimate partner violence, relational status should no longer
exculpate anyone from assault.
New empirical evidence and evolving societal and
international consensus have led to changing treatment of
juveniles and the curtailment of parental rights in numerous other
contexts. For instance, in the last decade, the Supreme Court has
greatly limited the punishment of juveniles who have committed
crimes. In prohibiting the death penalty, life without parole for
non-homicide crimes, and automatic life without parole
sentences, the Court relied heavily both on neurological evidence
about brain development as well as changing international
norms.96
Specifically as to the parent-child relationship, courts and
legislatures have limited parental choice in the two key areas of
education97 and medical treatment.98 One recent example is
94. C.f. Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting
Negligent Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 807, 812 (2006) (arguing for more consistent and
stringent prosecution of parents who negligently kill their children both because parents
do not always act in their children’s interests, and to reflect that parental rights also
implicate duties of care); see also Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your
Feet: The Criminal Justice System’s Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93
IOWA L. REV. 131, 133-34 (2007) (arguing that the incidence of child abuse shows us that
this is not always true, and that the law is too trusting in parental love).
95. See Straus, supra note 10. As to notions of children as property, see Woodhouse,
Who Owns the Child, supra note 31.
96. As to the first, see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (citing “scientific
and sociological studies” to confirm “a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young”). For the Court’s reliance on changing international norms for its
changed approach to the punishment of juveniles, see id. at 576 (citing the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child and “the overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty” to “provide respected and significant
confirmation for [its] own conclusions.”).
97. See N.Y. EDU. LAW §§ 3204(2) & 3210(2)(d) (limiting and regulating
homeschooling).
98. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d at 919; In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1979).
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mandatory vaccinations. In 2016, California enacted legislation
eliminating all exemptions.99 Scholars have persuasively argued
that this mandate is constitutionally permissible, despite parental
and religious objections, given the proven evidence of harm from
non-vaccinating.100 Indeed, Erwin Chemerinsky and Michelle
Goodwin contend that children’s uniquely vulnerable status make
parental harms particularly problematic and subject to state
regulation.101
Changed norms and, most importantly, scientific insights
have led to these major shifts in the law governing juveniles. Like
the rationales for curbing the punishment of minors, there is clear
social science consensus about the harms of corporal punishment.
Its abolition in other settings outside of the home, and even in
certain kinds of homes such as foster homes, demonstrate this.102
Similarly to non-vaccination, the widespread societal
consequences of parental corporal punishment can be seen as a
public health concern. The personhood injuries described above
compound the empirically proven harms of corporal punishment,
particularly for children already marginalized by race. Further
supporting a ban is the growing international consensus that
assault against children should not be condoned, even when, or
maybe particularly when, committed by parents. The line of abuse
has moved, and now includes beating and hitting that was
permitted during earlier times.103 Accordingly, we can no longer
exculpate in the name of children’s best interests.

99. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120335(b) (effective as of Jan. 1, 2016) (West
Supp. 2017) (“The governing authority shall not unconditionally admit any person as a
pupil of any private or public elementary or secondary school, child care center, day
nursery, nursery school, family day care home, or development center, unless, prior to his
or her first admission to that institution, he or she has been fully immunized.”).
100. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Compulsory Vaccination Laws Are
Constitutional, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 589, 594, 603-05 (2016) (arguing that a compulsory
vaccination law can withstand challenges based on parental rights and religious beliefs, and
describing courts’ consistent rejection of constitutional challenges to compulsory
vaccination laws).
101. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion Is Not a Basis for Harming
Others: Review Essay of Paul A. Offit’s Bad Faith: When Religious Belief Undermines
Modern Medicine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1111, 1128–31 (2016) (arguing against parents’ ability to
deny children medical care on the basis of their religious, or other philosophical, beliefs).
102. See supra notes 82-86, 49 (discussing the abolition of corporal punishment in
daycares, schools, etc. and the Magazu case).
103. There are no other remaining exceptions to criminal liability. In Blackstone’s
time, for instance, the discipline of wives, apprentices and students also constituted
exceptions to assault and battery laws. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

GODSOE_DRAFT 8.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

302

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/6/17 5:34 PM

[Vol. 32:281

A word on privacy. Family privacy, as noted above, is
intertwined with parental rights and other family constitutional
rights.104 Whether the corporal punishment occurs in a public or
private place also appears to influence judicial determinations of
its legitimacy. For instance, the court in Sweaney noted that the
mother hit her child at school in front of teachers.105 The father in
Dorvil spanked his child on the street, witnessed by two police
officers. Yet the public nature of the discipline did not just make
it more likely to be prosecuted.106 Instead, courts seem to consider
it part of the analysis distinguishing between acceptable parental
discipline and criminal assault. Tellingly, the trial court judge
explicitly noted the public nature of Dorvil’s corporal punishment
in finding him guilty, declaring “[i]f you’re in public with your
kids, it’s not appropriate to discipline in this fashion.”107 This
statement problematically implies that harm perpetuated in the
home is beyond the scope of state intervention.108
Assaults on children should be seen as a public problem, no
matter the location.109 Feminist scholars have presented a robust
critique of privacy as cover for intrafamilial harms and the
perpetuation of illegitimate hierarchies.110 They have persuasively
demonstrated that the private/public line is malleable and subject
COMMENTARIES *120. All of these have since been abolished. See Godsoe, Relational
Crime, supra note 22.
104. See supra note 27.
105. See Sweaney, 119 F.3d at 1387.
106. Presumably public assaults, particularly in front of mandated reporters, are also
more likely to result in prosecution.
107. Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d 861, 865–66 (Mass. 2015) (emphasis added)
(quoting trial court transcript at 99–100, which contains the remarks at sentencing by Julie
J. Bernard, J.). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the Appeals Court
of Massachusetts, which had affirmed the trial court's decision. See Dorvil, 32 N.E.3d at
872 (reasoning that “[i]t is understandable that parents would be angry at a child whose
misbehavior necessitates punishment, and we see no reason why such anger should render
otherwise reasonable uses of force impermissible”).
108. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) and
critique by Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth
Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992) (arguing that treating
children like parental property is unconstitutional).
109. See Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language,
and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1990).
110. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996) (demonstrating how “protect[ion of] the privacy
of the family and promot[ion of] ‘domestic harmony’” served to immunize men who beat
their wives from criminal sanctions); see also Schneider, supra note 18, at 976, 979 (arguing
that although “[t]he law claims to be absent in the private sphere[,]” it is very much present
in defining the family and instituting a hierarchy of “male [and adult] dominance”).
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to manipulation, protecting only certain types of families or
particular persons within families, usually not women and
children.111 As Frances Olson put it, “all private action can be
made to look public and vice versa.”112 Characterizing something
as private legitimizes it and precludes state intervention that
would limit power imbalances and harm.113 In the intimate partner
violence context, however, privacy is no longer an acceptable
justification for assault. Similarly, whether the child is in the home
or in a public place should not determine the legitimacy of
corporal punishment.
This is not to say that privacy is an unadulterated harm;
indeed, state intervention to regulate parental corporal
punishment is fraught with risks of disproportionality and the
policing of parenthood choices that should be protected.114 This is
particularly true of low-income women of color, who are overregulated and punished in both the child welfare and criminal
systems.115 These concerns, however, already exist since currently
we distinguish between justified parental corporal punishment
and unreasonable corporal punishment to mitigate them further;
moreover, privacy could be reenvisioned in an egalitarian fashion,
to protect all families against unwarranted state intrusion, while
simultaneously shielding all family members against intrafamilial
abuse.116 Consistent with this reimagined family privacy are
111. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 18, at 978 (“Definitions of ‘private’ and ‘public’ in
any particular legal context can and do constantly shift.”). As to privacy’s strategic use
against more marginalized families, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419,
1470 (1991) (noting “the contradictory meaning of the private sphere for women of color”
in describing their disproportionate punishment for actions during pregnancy); Kaaryn
Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income Women, 3
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297 (2013); see also Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public
Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 116 (2011) (detailing ethnographic research from
an obstetrics clinic demonstrating “gross and substantial intrusion by the government into
poor, pregnant women’s private lives”).
112. Frances Olson, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private
Distinction, 10 CONST. COMM. 319, 322 (1993).
113. Id. at 321 (including child abuse in the protected harmful conduct).
114. I further elaborate and address these concerns elsewhere. See Godsoe, Relational
Crime, supra note 22.
115. For a thoughtful analysis of this problem, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster
Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474 (2012).
116. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 745
(1999) (imagining an “egalitarian privacy” framework which would protect all family
members, a scheme under which both domestic violence “and parents batter[ing] their
children” would be “no longer acceptable”); see also Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts,
supra note 111, at 1465 (positing a right of privacy which “seeks to protect intimate or
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theories of parental rights as developmentally-based, and of
parents as trustees rather than owners or masters.117
CONCLUSION
I have argued here for the abolition of the parental
disciplinary privilege—a proposal that should not be radical, but
nonetheless is. There is widespread medical consensus that the
practice is ineffective, and often harmful. This scientific reality
negates the presumption of aligned parental and children’s
interests. Corporal punishment is often driven by parental
frustration, anger, or tradition; criminal assault and battery should
not fall within permissible child rearing methods. And yet,
because we largely ignore the treatment of children and overread
parental rights, widespread corporal punishment persists.
Although this Article addresses just one, albeit widespread,
harmful parenting practice, it has broader implications. This
analysis militates towards a narrower and more context-specific
reading of parental rights. As such, it supports revisiting other
parenting practices as we gain new empirical evidence and as
societal norms shift. Should parents be permitted to send their
children to unregulated “boot camps” with spotty safety
records?118 Require them to participate in religious activities that
promulgate racist or sexist hierarchies?119 Deny adolescents
mental health treatment because of personal disdain for
psychiatry or,120 conversely, force them to undergo ‘conversion
personal affairs [of all types of families] that are fundamental to an individual’s identity
and moral personhood from unjustified government intrusion”).
117. See supra notes 90–93 (describing the theoretical model).
118. See Cynthia Godsoe, All in the Family: Towards a New Representational Model
for Parents and Children, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 303 (2011).
119. See, e.g., The Remarkable Journey of Orthodox Jewish Woman Cast Out Into A
Life of Poverty by Her Family After Buying a Tight Sweater at 17…Who Then Went on to
Graduate Harvard, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 26, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2546290/Orthodox-Jewish-woman-shunned-family-age-17-graduates-Harvard.html
(discussing the case of Leah Vincent); see also Leo Hohmann, Islam Quiz Has U.S. Parents
Outraged, WND.COM (Sept. 29, 2015, 8:01 PM) (describing how teaching some basic facts
about Islam in a Georgia public school led thousands of parents and “concerned citizens”
to protest and petition for curricular change). Parents objected that only they should be
teaching children about religion, and that learning about Islam “goes against [their]
religion [Christianity] completely.” The teachers responded that they were merely trying
to teach children that the religions and communities were “equal.” Id.
120. See Judith Warner, The Denial of Mental Illness is Alive and Well, TIME (Sept.
14, 2012) (discussing one such case); see also Jennifer O’Neill, Parents ‘In Denial’ About
Teen’s Depression and Anxiety, YAHOO PARENTING (April 29, 2015),
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therapy’ if they are gay, transgender or gender nonconforming?121 These and a range of other questions merit the
attention of family law scholars and reformers in order to ensure
the best balance between parental choice and children’s safety
and best interests.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/parents-in-denial-about-teens-depression-and-11719582037
7.html.
121. All but a handful of states still permit parents to mandate this therapy, which has
resulted in trauma and, in some cases, suicide. See Julie Laemmle, California’s Conversion:
A Ban on Minor Conversion Therapy and the Effect on Other States, 2 IND. J.L. & SOC.
EQUALITY 248 (2013); Jody L. Herman, Parents of Transgender Children Need to Look at
the Research, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2015) (discussing the Leelah Alcorn case),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/01/08/is-it-child-abuse-to-make-a-trans-childchange/parents-of-transgender-children-need-to-look-at-the-research. Some commentators
have criticized bans on conversion therapy for infringing on parental rights. See, e.g., Lynn
Wardle, Anti-Gay Conversion Therapy Laws Infringe Parental Rights, CNS NEWS (Aug.
14, 2015, 3:52 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/commentary/lynn-wardle/anti-gayconversion-therapy-laws-infringe-parental-rights (“The anti-SOCE laws also appear to
seriously infringe parental rights, which long have long been deemed protected as
fundamental rights under the Constitution of the United States . . . . Perhaps the most
disturbing aspect of the anti-SOCE laws is their disregard for and denial of parental rights
to act in the best interests of their own children. That strikes a blow that harms not only
the parents who support SOCE treatment for their children, but ALL parents and children
. . . . The pursuit of political correctness is no justification for interference with the
constitutional rights of parents.”).

